Federal Deficit Spending and Partisanship: An Economic Analysis

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Title:	Federal Deficit Spending and Partisanship: An Economic Analysis
Author:	McGovern, Robert F.
Description:	The United States federal government has a substantial budget every year for various programs in the public interest. The money for these programs must come from somewhere: usually, either taxes or deficit spending. The concern of this paper is the latter element. Specifically, it is the goal of this paper to uncover whether annual budget deficits are affected by the partisan makeup of the institutions that decide how to spend money and how to obtain it: namely, Congress and the presidency. Does a Democratic president tend to cause higher deficits than a Republican? Is the behavior of a party any different in Congress than it would be in the presidency? These questions will be explored. After an historical overview and a literature review, I formulate a simple theoretical model to provide a basis for what I am trying to find. Then, I frame the questions of the paper into hypotheses and test manifold empirical models. After establishing which I find to be most fitting and subsequently revising that model, I discuss its implications and suggest areas for future research.
Permanent Link:	http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ysu1197410777 http://hdl.handle.net/2374.OX/3020
Date:	2007

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Now showing item 37 of 20230